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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
RAY N AISBITT, Guardian Ad Litem 
for DARRYL R. NAISBITT, a minor, 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
-vs.-
Case No. 8385 
JOSEPH EGGETT, 
Defendant and Respondent. 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
This is an action brought by Ray N aisbitt as guard-
ian ad litem for Darryl R. N aisbitt, a minor, to recover 
damages suffered by the minor when a sleigh on which 
he was riding collided with the automobile of the defend-
ant. At the conclusion of the evidence, the trial judge 
granted defendant's motion for a directed verdict on the 
grounds that no actionable negligence had been shown 
on the part of the defendant. The question presented 
by this appeal is whether the trial judge erred in so 
directing a verdict. 
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STATEl\!ENT OF FACTS 
This accident occurred on a curve where a road 
designated as the Ranch Road intersects the Mueller Park 
Road in the Mueller Park area southeast of the center 
of Bountiful in Davis County, Utah (R. 1). The Mueller 
Park Road extends in an easterly direction from Fourth 
East Street in Bountiful toward the mountains east of 
Bountiful (See diagram, Exhibit N). It travels general-
ly uphill to a point where the Ranch Road intersects it. 
From that point on, Mueller Park Road continues on east 
making a dip downhill. The Ranch Road extends to the 
south and uphill from its intersection with the Mueller 
Park Road for about 300 feet, where there is likewise 
a dip and the Ranch Road goes down hill (Tr. 99). There 
are a number of families who live on the Ranch Road 
who must use the Mueller Park Road in getting to and 
from their homes ( Tr. 104, 105). Mueller Park Road 
is also used by the families living on that road, including 
the defendant in this case (Tr. 170). Exhibits Hand C 
are photographs looking east on Mueller Park Road and 
show the dip in that road and the curve leading off into 
the Ranch Road which is on the right hand side of the 
pictures. Exhibits 1 and 2 show the same general scene. 
The photographs, Exhibits Band F, were taken from the 
Mueller Park Road looking around the curve and up the 
Ranch ;Road. Exhibits D and G are pictures taken from 
a different point on the Mueller Park Road looking up 
the Ranch Road toward the dip in the Ranch Road. Ex-
hibits A and E are taken from a point on the Ranch 
Road looking around the curve and toward the Mueller 
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Park Road. This accident occurred just around this curve 
on the Mueller Park Road. Exhibit C, looking east on 
the Mueller Park Road, and Exhibit E, taken from the 
Ranch Road and looking toward the Mueller Park Road, 
are reproduced in this brief for the convenience of the 
Court. 
In December of 1953, there had been a number of 
snow storms and the roads were covered with snow (Tr. 
53-101). A sign designating the road as a coasting lane 
had been put at the entrance to the :Mueller Park Road on 
Fourth East in Bountiful ( Tr. 53), and a Seth Williams 
had been designated to supervise the sleigh riding on the 
hill (Tr. 8). On the day of the accident, the defendant, 
Joseph Eggett, who lived a block east of the Ranch 
Road on the Mueller Park Road, got off work at eight 
o'clock in the morning and was returning to his home 
about nine o'clock (Tr. 159). As he got nearly to the 
top of the hill on the Mueller Park Road, his car started 
to quit, whereupon he turned it around and parked it 
on the right hand side, the north side, in the vicinity of 
the Ranch Road intersection with the front of the car 
facing west (Tr. 160). Leaving the car in that position, 
he walked home to his breakfast some short distance 
further up the Mueller Park Road (Tr. 160). 
On the same morning, the plaintiff, Darryl Richard 
Naisbitt, had been playing basketball at Darryl's home 
with his boy friend, Bruce Allen Litster (Tr. 108). At 
about 10 :00 A.M. they took Darryl's sleigh and a sleigh 
belonging to Darryl's brother and went over to the 
Mueller Park Road (Tr. 109). There they met the third 
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boy, Carlos Leland Litster, the brother of Bruce, at the 
-bottom of the hill (Tr. 109). When they arrived, a road 
scraper was scraping out an area at the bottom of the 
hill and Seth Williams would not let them go up the road 
(Tr. 110). At about 12:00 the road crew finished scrap-
ing and Seth Williams went home to lunch after telling 
the boys that they could go up the hill (Tr. 112). Darryl 
and Carlos took one sleigh and went about half way up 
the hill and sleighed down and were waiting for Bruce, 
who took the other sleigh, when a Mr. Grant Adams 
Child came along (Tr. 112). 
Grant Adams Child, who lived on the Ranch Road, 
arrived at tl!e bottom of the hill or the Mueller Park Road 
at about noon (Tr. 96). He was watching the children 
and did not notice Darryl's sleigh, which had been left 
in the middle of the road, until after his car had run over 
it (Tr. 96). Apparently in an effort to make up to the 
:boys for having run over their sleigh, he offered to give 
. them a ride up the hill (Tr. 97). Seth Williams had 
.. _apparently left before he. arrived, as there was no one 
. ~upervising -the boys at the time (Tr. 98). The Litster 
-boys and Darryl climbed into the c;:tr and Mr. Child 
took them up the Mueller Park Road to the Ranch Road 
and then around the curve and up the Ranch Road about 
300 feet to the point where the road dips off so that they 
could get the maximum amount of coasting (Tr. 98). 
When they got out of Mr. Child's car, Carlos Litster, 
who was fifteen years of age at the time, got on the 
sleigh first. Bruce Litster, who was thirteen years of age, 
got on next, and Darryl, who was eleven at the time, 
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got on the top. Darryl gave a push and the trio started 
down the hill (Tr. 143). In the meantime, the defendant, 
Joseph Eggett, had finished his breakfast and was re-
turning to his car with the idea of taking it to be fixed. 
As he walked down to the car, he met his brother, James 
Lynn Eggett, age eleven, who had come to the area to 
sleigh ride. The two of them walked down the hill to the 
defendant's car. About the time they arrived at the car, 
they saw Grant Child going up the road and both waved 
to him (Tr. 162). Getting into his car, the defendant 
found that the car would run with the front end fac~g 
down hill and assumed that the difficulty must be in the 
fuel pump (Tr. 162). Knowing that his wife wanted to 
go down town to do some shopping, he decided to take her 
with him and started backing the car up the hill toward 
his home to pick up his wife (Tr. 162). 
The defendant backed his car on the north side of the 
highway and his brother walked along the south side pull-
ing his sleigh and keeping about even with the side of 
the car (Tr. 162). As the defendant approached the 
Ranch Road turn he saw the sled with the three boys 
come around the curve and immediately stopped his car 
( Tr. 163). The boys were wide in their turn and struck 
the back of his car (Tr. 163). He immediately got out of 
his car and noticed Carlos standing up; Bruce sitting 
down; and Darryl lying in the snow (Tr. 163). Darryl 
had a cut over his eye and on his mouth (Tr. 163) and 
the defendant decided to take him to the doctor rather 
than to leave him on the hill. Bruce and Carlos got into 
his car and he put Darryl into the car and then drove 
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the three boys to the Bountiful Medical Center (Tr. 164). 
On cross-examination Carlos Litster testified that 
this was the first time that winter he had gone up the 
Ranch Road to sleigh ride ( Tr. 148). He testified that 
Seth Williams would usually take them to a point known 
as Sandy, a little 1nore than a block from the top of the 
hill in his jeep (Tr. 148), and stop the cars while the 
sleigh riders went down the hill (Tr. 149). He stated 
that he saw the Egget car as they came around the 
?urve. The car was backing slowly and was completely 
stopped when they hit the wheel of the car (Tr. 149). 
There was plenty of room to pass the car on the left and 
had they leaned more on the turn, they would have missed 
the car (Tr. 150). 
Bruce Litster said that as they came around the 
curve he saw the defendant looking out the back window 
of his car and backing his car (Tr. 153). He saw the de-
fendant turn and put on his brakes and testified that the 
car was stopped at the time they hit it (Tr. 153). They 
had tried to fall off the sleigh, but did not have time (Tr. 
153). 
He also testified that this was the first time he had 
been up the Ranch Road (Tr. 154), and on the way up, 
he had asked Mr. Child to let them out at a point called 
"Sandy", which is the place they usually started from 
(Tr. 154), and Mr. Child had said, "Why don't you come 
up further and you can get a longer ride f' He stated 
he knew that cars would use both the Mueller Park Road 
and the Ranch Road (Tr. 157), and that the boys could 
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not see around the curve because of an embankment and 
that they had not checked the cars on the Mueller Park 
Road prior to starting their ride down the hill (Tr. 158). 
Darryl Richard Naisbitt testified that as he came 
down the hill around the curve, he saw the car backing 
up on the north side of the highway (Tr. 115), and that 
Carlos had said to lean to the left so that they could 
turn and that he had leaned and felt like he was going to 
fall off and that was all that he reme1nbered until he woke 
up some time later in the hospital (Tr. 115). He testified 
that prior to the time Mr. Child took them up the hill, 
they would usually start riding from a point about one-
third of the way up the Mueller Park Road (Tr. 123, 124) 
(See the point marked "RN" on Exhibit N). He further 
testified that Seth vVilliams had made a run from the 
top of the hill and timed it and that a top speed of forty 
miles per hour had been obtained in the run down the hill 
(Tr. 126). He stated that he knew both roads were 
traveled by persons living in the area ( Tr. 128). 
Upon the basis of this evidence, the court in granting 
a directed verdict said: 
"In giving the widest latitude that I can-
giving you the benefit of all the ramifications that 
you are entitled to have-from the evidence there 
isn't anything in this record, in the opinion of this 
court, which justifies this court submitting it to 
the jury. I think the court would be derelict in 
this case to jeopardize the defendant's rights in 
submitting this case to a jury, so I'm going to 
grant the motion for a directed verdict." 
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STATEMENT OF POINTS 
POINT I. 
THE DEFENDANT WAS NOT GUILTY OF ANY NEGLI-
GENCE WHICH WAS A PROXIMATE CAUSE OF INJURY 
TO THE PLAINTIFF. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. 
THE DEFENDANT WAS NOT GUILTY OF ANY NEGLI-
GENCE WHICH WAS A PROXIMATE CAUSE OF INJURY 
TO THE PLAINTIFF. 
In the first two points of the argument in his brief, 
the plaintiff and appellant makes the assertions: 
(1) In order for the court to grant a request for a 
directed verdict grounded on non-negligence of the de-
fendant, the record must disclose no evidence against 
the party so requesting upon which reasonable minds 
could find him guilty of the negligence charged. 
( 2) In reviewing the evidence where the defendant 
was granted a directed verdict, the court must view the 
evidence in the light most favorable to the plaintiff to 
determine whether or not there was sufficient evidence to 
go to the jury. 
We find no fault with these two pronouncements of 
the law and consequently will not discuss them further. 
Rather we will proceed to what we consider to be the real 
issue of this case; that is, whether the defendant was 
guilty of negligence which might be found by the jury 
to be the proximate cause of injury to the plaintiff. 
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The evidence in this case discloses a chain of circum-
stances, negligent or otherwise, over which the defendant 
had no control, which ultimately resulted in the accident 
in this case. As was stated by counsel for the defendant 
in his motion for a directed verdict: 
"* * * It appears affirmatively from the evi-
dence that there was fault, negligent acts, omis-
sion or commission on the part of other persons 
which entered into the cause of this accident, and 
for which the defendant will not be responsible. 
One is the lack of supervision the County failed 
to provide at the time and place of the accident. 
The failure of Seth Williams to either remain on 
the job or have some one else there to supervise 
it, the failure to have any supervision whatsoever 
at the time and place where this accident occurred, 
and it appearing that this was the first time these 
boys had gone up the Ranch Road during this year, 
and certainly they had never been thete to the 
knowledge of the defendant. The lack of super-
vision here is certainly more of a legal cause for 
this type of accident than trying to blame the 
defendant under these conditions. There is also 
the acts of conduct of Grant Child, who, knowing 
the conditions then and there existihg, took these 
boys up on the Ranch Road, knowing there would 
be danger in coasting down the Ranch Road, and 
especially where they didn't have any visibility 
of the traffic on the Mueller Park Road. Then 
there is also the conduct of Carlos Litster, who 
was the oldest of the boys, and who was directing 
the sleigh, who knew the conditions then and there 
~isting, or should have known them, and the 
hazards involved. So you have the acts of several 
people here who entered into this thing, and all of 
them that I have mentioned-in my opinion any-
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way-certainly had more to do with causing this 
accident than the defendant, whose acts if any-
thing simply furnished a condition, rather than 
being an actual legal cause of the accident itself. 
Then as a fourth ground, the contributory negli-
gence of the plaintiff himself. From his own 
testimony, it appeared that he knew there was 
danger, yet he ran the risk of riding three deep 
on the sleigh and coasting down a steep hill, where 
he knew that on Mueller Park Road the speed 
got up to as high as forty miles per hour, and on 
the Ranch Road, where their speed was estimated 
to be twenty or twenty-five per hour, which cer-
tainly was an unsafe condition in riding around 
that curve on the Ranch Road with no visibility, 
and where admittedly the collision would have 
been avoided had the boys seen the car even a 
fraction of a second sooner, or had they exercised 
more care in reducing their speed or even leaning 
further to the left in order to avoid the collision. 
That they barely did strike the car. I think there 
are many cases where a situation of this kind 
exists where a car stopped on a highway, or in a 
position on the highway, even though it's in move-
ment, is nothing more than a condition and not 
the actual cause of the accident itself. Not the ac-
tual legal cause." 
Let us examine the acts of the defendant. Since he 
lived on the road and necessarily had to travel back and 
forth on Mueller Park Road to get to his home, it was not 
negligent for him to be on the road. Nor was there any-
thing negligent about the manner in which he parked his 
car. He was also backing his car at the time of the acci-
dent at a very slow speed, since his brother was walking 
alongside. He saw the boys coming down the hill and 
10 
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was therefore keeping a lookout and had completely 
stopped his car at the time of the accident. The mechani-
cal failure of the car had nothing to do with the accident 
except that it might explain his being there at the par-
ticular time of the accident. Nor did his backing cause 
the accident. There is no evidence that he lacked any 
control over the car by reason of the backward movement 
of the same that he would have had if the car had been 
moving forward. The accident would have happened just 
as it did had his car been faced in the opposite direction 
at the same ti1ne and place. 
The plaintiff and appellant cites several cases to the 
effect that a person should exercise care in backing an 
automobile, especially when he knows or should know that 
there are children about. Again we agree with the au-
thorities cited, but in this instance feel that they are not 
applicable to this case for two reasons: 
(1) The defendant had no reason to know that there 
were any children about at the time he was backing. The 
evidence shows that the children usually started at a point 
down the hill from the intersection of the Ranch Road, 
and that the defendant had no reason to know or to be-
lieve that the children would be sleigh riding down the 
Ranch Road. 
(2) The defendant exercised all the care in backing 
his automobile that might be expected of him assuming 
that he knew or should have known that the children were 
sleigh riding in the area. He was backing slowly. He was 
watching to the rear of the car. He had his car under 
11 
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control. And lastly, he was able to stop the same within 
a reasonable time upon seeing the children. 
It is assumed that the defendant was negligent for 
backing his vehicle on the right side of the highway, the 
assertion being made that he was driving on the wrong 
side of the road. We know of no law which compels such 
a conclusion. Section 41-6-55 Utah Code .Annotated 1953, 
provides that a vehicle shall be driven upon the right 
half of the roadway with certain exceptions, none of 
which are applicable here. We find no statute which 
specifically states which side of the road a vehicle shall 
be driven on when it is backing up. We ·will concede that 
under certain circumstances, not present here, it would 
be negligent to even try to back a vehicle along a high-
way. On the other hand, there are a number of situations 
in which it is necessary to back an automobile, such as in 
getting out of a parking place. Under the theory advo-
cated here, every vehicle which attempted to back out of a 
parking place would be driving on the wrong side of the 
highway. 
Moreover, even if we assume the vehicle was being 
driven on the wrong side of the road, this was no more 
a proximate cause of this accident than the fact that a 
vehicle might be parked facing the wrong way on the side 
of a highway is the cause of another car running into it 
when so parked. Of course, it is admitted that if the de-
fendant and his automobile had been nowhere in the 
vicinity at the time of the accident, this accident would 
not have occurred. Therein lies the crux of this case. 
The defendant's being where he was when he was and 
12 
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under the circumstances then existing was not negligence, 
but rather a condition but for which the accident would 
not have happened. 
As stated in Blashfield's Cyclopedia of .Automobile 
Law and Practice, Vol. 4, Part II, page 31: 
"A distinction must be drawn between the 
proximate cause of an accident and a mere condi-
tion. 
"The slippery condition of a street or side-
walk may be a mere condition, or a cloud of dust, 
or smoke, snow, fog, mist, blinding lights or other 
elements impairing vision, as well as ice and place 
of parking. 
"So a distinction is drawn between a wrongful 
act, which is at least a contributing cause of the 
injuries sued for, and one which is merely an at-
tendant circumstance or condition, though perhaps 
a necessary condition of the acts resulting in such 
injury. An event may be one without which a 
particular injury would not have occurred; yet, 
if it was merely the condition or occasion afford-
ing opportunity for other events to produce the 
injury, it is not the proximate cause thereof. • • • 
"As an illustration, where plaintiff's vision 
was obscured by a cloud of dust, caused when an-
other automobile which he was following swerved 
and left the paved portion of the highway to avoid 
a heavily loaded and disabled wagon left on the 
highway overnight by defendants, the proximate 
cause of the collision between the plaintiff and the 
wagon was defendant's neglect in leaving it on the 
highway, in violation of a statute, and not the 
cloud of dust, which was merely a. condition and 
contingency which naturally would arise under 
13 
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the circumstances, and defendant was bound to 
anticipate that it would happen." 
Illustrative of this principle is the case of Blair v. 
Rice, et al, (Ore.) 246 P. (2) 542. In that case the plain-
tiff was a passenger in an automobile which skidded on 
a patch of ice and struck the defendant's truck which was 
parked partially on the highway. The court held that 
the existence of ice constituted an intervening operation 
. of a force of nature which caused the automobile in which 
plaintiff was a passenger to strike the truck because it 
could not be steered away from it, and the failure of 
the defendants to park the truck off the highway or to 
maintain a lookout or to display warning signals or to 
park the truck elsewhere than in the icy patch was not 
negligence. In deciding the case, the court said : 
"Assuming, but not deciding, that the defend-
ants negligently failed to maintain a lookout and 
give notice that their truck was standing upon a 
part of the pavement, we still do not believe that 
plaintiff was entitled to recover. All of the road-
way to the left of the truck was free of traffic, as 
is evident from the fact that the car ahead of the 
Blair car, after being hit by it, skidded safely 
along the left half of the pavement. .The only 
reason the Blair car ran into the truck was because 
it had escaped from the control of the plaintiff's 
husband and he could not steer it away from its 
target. Had a flagman been present, his signals, 
no matter how patent and numerous, would not 
have restored the control of the skidding car to its 
driver. The ice had taken charge of the situa-
tion. It constituted an 'intervening operation of 
a force of nature' within a contemplation of Sec-
tion 451, Restatement of the Law of Torts. ( Cita-
14 
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tion). If the truck, instead of being motionless, 
had been moving slowly upon the paved portion 
of the roadway which it occupied, the collision 
would, nevertheless, have occurred. Under the 
circumstances, the presence of the truck must be 
deemed to be a condition rather than a legal cause 
of the injury;" 
Turning now to authorities dealing with negligence 
in situations similar to this, we find: 
"If the driver does not know and has no 
reasonable grounds for knowing that boys are, 
or are likely to be, sliding on an intersecting street 
at the tiine of passing at right angles thereto, 
he is not negligent because he does not take pre-
caution to prevent injury to a boy so sliding, if he 
does what he can to avoid striking the child after 
seeing his situation. Accordingly, if a motorist 
comes into a collision with a sled which is coming 
rapidly and not under control, and which does 
not give a warning or opportunity to apprehend 
its approach, he is not liable for the injuries re-
sulting. 
"vVhere a street on which coasting is permis-
sible intersects with a street on which it is for-
bidden, a driver turning into the street on which 
coasting is permissible has been held not to be 
required in the exercise of ordinary care to anti-
cipate that the two streets were being used as a 
common coasting ground. 
"In at least one jurisdiction the humanitarian 
or last clear chance doctrine has been applied to 
motorists injuring children playing in the street. 
Under this principle, a driver is liable, notwith-
standing the negligence of the boy, after seeing 
the boy, or could have seen him had he used rea-
15 
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sonable care, and realized, or could have realized, 
his peril in time to avoid injuring, he failed to act 
as a reasonably prudent person to avoid so doing. 
"As in other situations involving injuries to 
children, the drivers of motor vehicles are not 
insurers against such accidents, and, if the driver 
has exercised the care of a reasonably prudent 
man under the circumstances, he is not liable for 
injuries resulting from a collision between the 
vehicle he was driving and a boy coasting in the 
street." (Cyclopedia of Automobile Law, Blash-
field, Page 427, Vol. 2 A.) 
The action of Pennington Adm'r. v. Pure Milk Com-
pany, (Ky.) 130 S.W. (2) 24, involved the death of a 
thirteen year old boy who was killed while coasting. 
The accident occurred about 7:30 in the evening. Plain-
tiff's intestate and a group of about eight boys were 
edasting down the hill in the direction from which the 
defendant's truck was approaching. The truck had been 
operated on the right hand side of the highway until the 
driver came into view of a group of coasters. The driver 
thereupon applied the brakes and. moved his truck to-
ward the center of the roadway to miss one sled on his 
north. At that moment the sled carrying the deceased 
struck the truck. A verdict was directed for the defendant 
by the lower court. The reviewing court said: 
"It is sufficient to state that there is no show-
ing of negiigence on the part ot the appellee's 
driver. Even appellant's o-wn witnesses admit that 
the driver of the truck was ori his right side of the 
highway until the swarm of sleds S"\yung into 
view. . His acts thereafter iyere instinctive, in the 
face of an emergency not of his making-an emer-
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gency at least partially attributable to appellant's 
decedent. In Commonwealth v. Bowman, 267 Ky. 
50, 100 S.W. (2) 801, 803, we held: 'That one meet-
ing a sudden danger, not of his own creation, al-
though bound to take active measures to save him-
self from impending harm, is not held by the law 
to the same degree of judgment and activity that 
he might be held were the condition otherwise. 
A choice of evils or of dangerous causes may be 
all that is left to a man, and he is not to be blamed 
if he chooses one and not the other to escape if he 
is in difficult and perilous circumstances and com-
pelled to decide hurriedly.' " 
In Praded v. McGowan, (N.H.) 190 Atl. 287, the de-
fendant was driving his automobile in an easterly direc-
tion on a highway. On the south side of the highway a 
group of children were watching for automobiles. Plain-
tiff, a six year old, commenced to slide down the hill to-
ward the highway when warned by his friends of the ap-
proaching automobile. Plaintiff was unable to stop his 
sled in time to avoid entering the street and colliding 
with the automobile operated by the defendant. De-
fendant testified that he saw the group of children and 
veered to the left of the roadway, but saw nothing to 
indicate that a sled was coming down the hill. When he 
did see the sled, he immediately applied his brakes and 
brought his vehicle to a stop just at the point of collision. 
On appeal, judgment was awarded to defendant. The 
court pointed out that even though the defendant had 
passed this particular spot about every week or so for 
several weeks, this was not sufficient to charge him with 
the knowledge that children were in the habit of sleigh 
17 
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riding in this area, and further, he was not negligent in 
failing_ to see the boy in time to avert the accident. 
In Party, et al, v. Kendall, et al, 228 N.Y.S. (2) 25, 
an infant plaintiff was coasting on a sled on a very icy 
hill in violation of a village ordinance. He was relying 
on an eight year old boy to stand at the intersection and 
warn him of approaching traffic. The infant plaintiff 
knew of the danger involved at this intersection. Immedi-
ately before the collision, at a point thirty feet from the 
collision, he was warned of the approach of defendant's 
automobile. However, he slid into the intersection, passed 
the stop sign, and the collision occurred. Plaintiff had 
a verdict below, which was reversed in favor of the de-
fendant on appeal, the court saying: 
"In the light of all the circumstances and par-
ticularly the knowledge of the infant plaintiff of 
the danger, we are of the opinion that he failed 
to exercise the reasonable care required of him 
and was guilty of contributory negligence as a 
matter of law." 
In McBride, Adrnr. v. Stewart, (Iowa) 290 N.W. 
700, the accident between the plaintiff who was riding 
on a sled and the defendant's vehicle occurred at an in-
tersection in the city of Eldora. The snow had melted 
somewhat on the streets and evidently the more traveled 
portion of the roadway was bare, but there was still snow 
to the sides of the street. Plaintiff's decedent, a child of 
seven years, was coasting down the street toward the 
·east. Defendant was approaching in a northerly direction 
on the intersecting street. The child entered the inter-
-18 
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section and struck the left rear wheel. At the close of the 
evidence, defendant's motion for a directed verdict was 
sustained. On appeal by plaintiff the court held: 
"Turning to the record it discloses that de-
fendant was driving twenty miles per hour in a 
residential district up to the mon1ent he saw de-
cedent coming into the intersection. He then soon 
stopped, but the accident had occurred. Defendant 
had all the control of his car that was incidental 
to that speed. He was o bRerving the street ahead 
and 14th Avenue and noted that there were neither 
vehicles nor pedestrians thereon. As he drove to-
ward the intersection any vehicles or pedestrians 
on Tenth Street or Fourteenth A venue would 
have been readily visible and there was no obstruc-
tion of view requiring giving a signal of approach-
ing the intersection. The testimony established the 
fact that as defendant approached the intersection, 
he was prevented by the snow bank from seeing 
decedent as he came down the hill. The witnesses 
most favorable to plaintiff stated that at a point 
about twenty-five feet south of the south line of 
the hill one could look up the hill and see what 
was there. The evidence further shows that de-
fendant first saw decedent just as the latter was 
entering the intersection from the west, the de-
cedent being then three or four feet out from the 
south curb and two or three feet east of the east 
line of the sidewalk on Tenth Street. Defendant 
was then approximately even with the south edge 
of the sidewalk that is located along the south side 
of Fourteenth A venue. 
"These facts were quite insufficient to estab-
lish that defendant was negligent in any of the 
respects plaintiff specified. But plaintiff says that 
there were surrounding circumstances known to 
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defendant and that these determined what was 
reasonable care on his part. The circumstances 
were these. For many years it had been the prac-
tice of those in authority to permit children to 
coast on this hill, and each time, while permission 
continued, barricades were maintained on Tenth 
Street at the intersection in question. There had 
been coasting recently permitted, but the snow 
having in a large measure melted, the barricades 
had been taken down on the day before the acci-
dent and the middle portion of the paving up and 
down the hill was bare of snow. Plaintiff urges 
that these facts, known to defendant, imposed the 
duty on him to anticipate that some child might be 
coasting as decedent was doing and to be prepared 
for that possibility by driving at less speed and 
having better control, keeping better lookout and 
sounding a warning of approach. In Webster v. 
Luckow, 219 Iowa 1048, 258 N.W. 685, this court 
adopted the Pennsylvania rule that a driver of an 
automobile may not assume that a child under 
the age of fourteen in plain view of the driver 
will not move from a position of safety outside 
the pathway of the vehicle and into a place of 
danger in such pathway. But in connection with 
so doing, the court declared itself as not holding 
that such driver is under any obligation to anti-
cipate that some child not in plain view upon the 
street or public road will suddenly and unex-
pectedly dart out from a place of concealment 
into the pathway of a driver's vehicle. To an 
ordinary prude-nt person, the disappearance of 
snow from the hill until it was largely bare and 
the taking down of the barricades would appear 
to afford assurances that the road was open to his 
ordinary use. And we think it would be an assur-
ance sufficiently dependable that he would not an-
ticipate that a child would dart out upon a sled 
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as happened in this case, despite all that appeared 
to indicate to the contrary. If so, defendant's con-
duct was not below the usual standard of ordinary 
and reasonable care. The ground that has been 
discussed warranted the ruling on the motion for a 
directed verdict." 
In a Pennsylvania case, Covelchic v. Demo, 94 Pa. 
Supra, 167, the parents of an eleven year old boy brought 
an action to recover consequential damage suffered as 
the result of his being struck by defendant's truck. It 
appeared that the boy coasted out from a twelve foot 
alley, on which there was a slight grade, and into a 
twenty-seven foot wide street, and immediately upon 
entering the street ran under the truck, which came from 
his left, and was run over by the rear wheel. The acci-
dent occurred at dusk. The truck's lights had not been 
turned on, but the street lights had, although the one 
at the alley was dark, being out of repair. Plaintiffs 
charged negligence as to speed, lights, failing to sound 
horn in violation of certain ordinances relating to opera-
tions of automobiles at the intersection. In affirming a 
judgment entered for the defendant, notwithstanding ver-
dict for the plaintiffs, the reviewing court said: 
"Even in full daylight, neither the occupant 
of the sled nor the driver of the truck could see 
each other until the intersection was reached, by 
reason of the retaining wall around the property 
on the left. This wall, about four feet high at the 
corner, was on the left of the boy and the right of 
the defendant as they approached the intersection. 
"" "" • The only question involved on this appeal 
is whether plaintiffs have sustained the burden of 
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proof resting upon them to show that the defend-
ant was guilty of negligence and that such negli-
gence caused the injury complained of. • • • No 
ordinances of the city * * * were offered in evi-
dence and the testimony for the plaintiffs not only 
fails to show that defendant's truck was operated 
at an excessive rate of speed but directly nega-
tived that charge and indicates it was stopped al-
most instantly after the sled ran under it. The 
first and s~cond specifications of negligence 
(speed and ordinance violations) may therefore 
be dismissed from consideration. And taking up 
the third and fourth charges of negligence we 
assume * * * that defendant did not sound his 
horn1 as he approached the alley and that the 
lamps upon his truck were not lighted. * * * The 
only possible inference from the testimony for the 
plaintiffs is that this (alley) was not a place where 
the drivers of vehicles on (the street in question) 
might reasonably anticipate the presence of chil-
dren upon sleds. It was not generally used for 
coasting. * * * In our opinion there was no evi-
dence which would legally support the finding 
that the failure of the defendant to sound his 
horn was under all the circumstances, a negligent 
omission to perform a legal duty. The remaining 
ground for recovery averred * • * is the failure 
of defendant to have lamps upon his vehicle light-
ed. Plaintiffs offered no evidence with respect to 
weather conditions or actual visibility at the time 
of the occurrence." 
The court then concluded that the trial judge was 
warranted in taking judicial notice of the time of sunset, 
and the evidence was that the accident occurred less than 
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Thus we see that an act may be necessary to the 
happening of an accident; that is, a condition without 
which the accident would not have happened, and yet not 
be the legal cause of the accident. In this case, the de-
fendant was not guilty of any wrongful act which was a 
legal cause of the accident. He was driving very slowly. 
He was maintaining a proper lookout and saw the boys 
and immediately stopped his car before the collision. He 
had no reason to expect the boys to be sleigh riding in 
that area and to come around the curve in question, that 
not being a place where the boys were permitted to or 
usually coasted, but even if we assume that he did know 
or should have known, it is not seen how he could have 
been more careful. 
CONCLUSION 
The accident itself in this case and the resulting in-
juries to the plaintiff was brought about by the operation 
of a number of factors over which the defendant had 
no control. The County may have been negligent in fail-
ing to provide adequate supervision of the sleigh riding 
on the hill. Seth Williams, the person who was desig-
nated to take care of the hill, may have been negligent in 
leaving and going home when the boys were sleigh rid-
ing. Grant Adams Child was surely negligent in taking 
the boys up on the Ranch Road to sleigh ride, where 
sleigh riding had never been permitted before, especially 
when the boys themselves knew this and protested and 
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requested to be let out on that part of the hill from which 
they usually started. The boys themselves knew that they 
were not permitted to sleigh ride on the area in question. 
They knew that automobiles would be traveling back and 
forth upon the Mueller Park Road, as well as the Ranch 
Road. They were aware of the fact that they could not 
see around the curve and they were also aware of the high 
speeds which were attained by sleds in going down this 
hill. Whether or not they could be found guilty of contri-
butory negligence, we cannot overlook the fact that their 
own acts and omissions, negligent or otherwise, were the 
immediate proximate cause of this accident. Unless we 
are prepared to hold that the defendant was negligent in 
even being in the area, which, of course, is not warranted, 
we can find no culpable action on his part. IIe had no 
reason to know that the boys were sleigh riding in the 
area, yet, he could not have exercised any greater caution 
had he known. He was driving his automobile very slow-
ly, observing a proper lookout, and was able to stop the 
automobile immediately upon seeing the boys before the 
collision. The boys themselves were going so fast that 
they could neither turn, nor get off of the sleigh fast 
enough to avoid the collision, even though they saw the 
automobile when they were a considerable distance from 
it. 
The most that can be said for the defendant's pres-
ence in the area at the time and under the existing cir-
cumstances is that his presence was a condition without 
which this accident would not have happened, but was 
not the legal cause of the accident, which would have 
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occurred in spite of and not on account of any negligence 
of which he was alleged to be guilty. 
Respectfully submitted, 
STEW ART, CANNON & HANSON 
and DON J. HANSON 
Attorneys for Defendant and 
Respondent 
520 Continental Bank Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
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